Abstract: Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs) are charged with regulating a public utility's rates at levels that serve the public's interest while allowing the utility's investors to earn a rate commensurate with that expected by businesses facing similar risks. Although the process of adjusting rates for risk is a staple of modern finance, we know surprisingly little about how well accomplish their regulatory mandate when judged against the benchmarks of financial economics. This article analyzes a dozen years' worth of gas and electric rate-setting decisions from PUCs in the United States and Canada, demonstrating empirically that allowed returns on equity (ROE) diverge significantly and systematically from the predictions of accepted asset pricing methodologies in finance. Our analysis suggests that current regulatory practice more plausibly reflects an amalgam of other non-finance desiderata, including political goals, incentive provision, and regulatory capture. For example, elected PUCs award significantly lower ROEs than appointed ones. We nevertheless conjecture that the divergence of observed regulatory behavior from assetpricing fundamentals may be due (in part) to a lack of financial valuation expertise among regulators. To test this conjecture, we study a unique field experiment that exposed commissioners and their staffs to immersion training in finance. We find evidence that treated PUCs began to issue ROE rulings that were (moderately) more aligned with standard asset pricing theory than those of untreated placebo groups. Our results suggest that it is possible to train non-expert legal and regulatory decision-makers to exhibit greater fidelity to principles of financial economics.
I. Introduction
During the last three decades, a dramatic transformation has been underway in regulatory areas where time and risk valuation affect legal outcomes: The steady growth in the centrality of financial valuation methodologies. While such approaches were generally foreign to legal and regulatory decision-making in the early 1980s, corporate finance now permeates a vast and growing set of doctrinal areas, ranging from securities fraud, to corporate law, to tax and to mergers and acquisitions.
1 Among this burgeoning set of applications, the advance of finance into regulation of public utilities was perhaps particularly inevitable. Indeed, the challenge of scrutinizing rates of return has long been a key element of utilities regulation, reflecting an expansive conception of necessary state and federal regulatory power over the actions of natural monopolies, often with important economic implications in play. 2 As is well known, the legal governance of public utilities is designed to ensure that the utility provides critical services to the public at reasonable costs, and to protect consumers against bargaining inequalities, informational disadvantage, collusive pricing, and market inefficiency due to the public's dependency on the continuous provision of public necessity. At the same time, for both legal and practical reasons, regulators must also allow utilities' capital providers to recoup a competitive rate of return on their investments. Accordingly, public utility commissions (PUCs) are vested with power to supervise, administer and regulate the economic activities of utilities, all in the name of striking this balance.
A key component of the utilities regulation process thus pertains to regulating prices that yield an appropriate risk-adjusted return that utilities are entitled to earn. This mandate goes back at least a full century, reflected in the famous Bluefield Waterworks edict from the United States Supreme Court:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to such profits as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.
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It was not until decades after Bluefield, however, that advances in financial economics made it practically possible to address the above mandate formally, using a variety of asset-pricing methodologies. A prime example of such methodological approaches is the Capital Asset Pricing
Model-or CAPM-one of a host of now well-accepted approaches for determining how to adjust expected rates of return for anticipated risks. 4 Yet, to what extent do rate regulators render decisions that comport with standard financial methodology in their decision-making process? This paper offers an empirical analysis of rates awarded by public utility commissions (PUCs), evaluating their relationship to factors that standard finance theory predicts would drive expected ROEs. We analyze data of nearly a thousand
PUCs gas and electric rate-setting decisions over a twelve-year period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) emanating from PUCs across the United States and Canada. Our benchmark for analysis is the lens of accepted asset-pricing theories from financial economics. Specifically, we frame our inquiry with a simple and intuitive proposition:
(a) If regulators set rates of return for public utilities in a manner consistent with their presumed legal mandate (i.e., by calibrating awarded returns against investment risk);
(b) Then adjudicated rates of return should track those prescribed for individual utilities according to accepted asset pricing models in finance (such as the CAPM).
Our analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis above with significant confidence: we demonstrate that rate setting practices diverge appreciably (perhaps even violently) from the predictions of financial economics across numerous dimensions. For example, awarded gross returns on equity (ROEs) tend to exhibit considerable stickiness around focal "odometer" points (particularly a flat 10%) regardless of the cyclical structure of other prevailing benchmark rates.
Moreover, awarded ROE spreads have progressively widened significantly since 2005, even though systematic risk in the utilities industry has fallen continuously during the same period.
Indeed, if the awarded ROEs were an asset class, they would generate a mean positive abnormal return ("alpha") of between 7.5 and 8.5 percent, an amount that overshadows even the performance of Fortune Magazine's top twenty stock investments for the last decade. 5 Moreover, average awarded ROEs are strongly inversely related both to company leverage -a correlation that is at odds to basic predictions of capital structure. Finally, as anticipated market returns (i.e., systematic risk) have fluctuated during the period studied, awarded ROE spreads have consistently (and curiously) moved in the opposite direction, notwithstanding the fact that market returns on utilities' equity overwhelmingly have positive betas. Our analysis thus confidently rejects the hypothesis that awarded ROEs behave anywhere near what finance theory predicts would be the expected return of a commensurably risky investment.
What, then, explains the extreme deviation from standard finance theory's predictions? We tentatively identify some factors may be at play, including the possibility that regulators' behavior reflects objectives that are either orthogonal or opposed to precise risk-return calibration, such as serving political constituencies, providing dynamic incentives, and possibly even regulatory capture. We find evidence that the structural composition of the PUC is reflected in awarded ROEs:
the percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower awarded ROEs, with completely elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower returns on equity than completely appointed ones. This electoral effect may represent the cost that commissioners pay with rate payers by setting rates too high, and/or the greater impediments to regulatory capture by elected commissioners.
Higher awarded rates may also aim to sustain an equity cushion designed to improve incentives for reliability. 6 "Inventorying" power is still beyond the capacity of most generators.
Sustaining the continuous and uninterrupted electricity service therefore requires maintenance of continuous and almost instantaneous balance between production and consumption of electricity in power systems. 7 On certain occasions (such as the Super Bowl), utilities can expect the spike in demand, but not all spikes and dips can be foreseen. To mitigate the risk of power shortages and blackouts, some margin of excess generation capacity above the expected demand load must be kept at all times. Higher awarded rates can sustain investments in excess capacity and may theoretically enhance the reliability of energy provision in the light of the volatility of capital expenditures and the lack of technical storage feasibility. Moreover, as their status as monopolies exclusively providing social necessities renders utilities "too important to fail", 8 rate regulation may implicitly function as micro-prudential regulation for public utilities, using the equity cushion to mitigate the risk of insolvency and illiquidity. The prioritization of such other goals may provide a cogent account for why PUCs appear to veer so far from accurate calibration of risk-adjusted returns.
That said, we also conjecture that at least part of the reason for the deviation of awarded rates from the predictions of financial economics stems from the technical demands that asset pricing models place on regulators and their staffs. To test this conjecture, we exploit data from a unique field experiment that exposed state-level PUC commissioners and staffs to immersion training in asset pricing and finance. We find some evidence that finance training results in some moderate effects on later ROE proceedings, inducing rate decisions that are more closely aligned with the predictions of finance. Our findings suggest that it may be possible to train non-expert legal decision-makers to exhibit far greater fidelity to core principles of asset pricing than they are otherwise inclined to exhibit.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide a high-level overview of the rate-setting process, and its criticality to utility profitability and solvency. There we provide a brief overview of some details in formulating the weighted average cost of capital, an all-thingsconsidered rate of return that combines tax rates, leverage levels, returns on debt and the allimportant return on equity (ROE). We demonstrate how critical (and contentious) ROE determinations are to the overall process, and describe prevailing methodologies used by PUCs to Public utilities are widely considered natural monopolies, and regulation is designed to mitigate the monopoly costs, so that monopoly prices do not transfer wealth from the energy consumers to the stockholders of the firm. 9 The welfare loss from the self-rationed production of the monopoly is often called "the deadweight costs" of monopoly, as some consumers who would have purchased at the competitive price are restricted from purchase, resulting in welfare loss.
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Vulnerability to the exercise of market power is the primary justification for rate regulation. 11 In the energy sector, this market power carries significant negative externalities with distributional consequences. Because utilities provide public necessities, and can be conceptualized as geographical franchises for energy provision, consumers' disadvantage, imposition, unreasonable charges, harmful prices, and harmful standards of service are also well recognized regulatory concerns.
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For these reasons, prices charged by electric and gas utilities are regulated in the United
States by a target market capitalization rate for the firm's common stock. 13 The authority for rate regulation is divided between the federal government and the states, where the bright line gives the federal government, acting through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the jurisdiction over the interstate aspects of power and electricity, while the states are granted the jurisdiction for intrastate matters, including, most notably, retail sale
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There are therefore two jurisdictions for rate-setting cases: the FERC for utilities providing interstate power infrastructure, and the state-based public utility commissions for utilities providing retail intrastate power service.
The basic principle that guides regulation of electric rates in both jurisdictions is that prices should reflect the "cost of service". 15 Among the costs of service, regulators are required to compute the utility's rate of return (ROR), which is typically embodied by the utilities Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)-essentially a tax-adjusted weighted average cost of debt and the expected return of preferred and common stock that a utility has issued to finance its investments. The cost of debt is usually straightforward, since it is largely observable in a utility's debt contracts. But how much should electric and gas utility stockholders earn? The statutory standard running as a scarlet thread throughout energy legislation determines the rates charged by a utility provider should be "just and reasonable"
16
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As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the fixing of "just and reasonable" rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interest: the rate should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital, on the one hand, and protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of private utility corporations, on the other. 17 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time, and in the same region of the country, on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties
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. A "just and 16 Under the Federal Power Act all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with interstate wholesale sales shall be "just and reasonable"; so too all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges: 16 U.S.C.S. § 824(b)(1); 16 U.S. C.S. § 824d(a). If the FERC sees a violation of that standard, it must determine the just and reasonable rate and impose it by order: 16 U.S.C.S. § 824e(a). Similarly, many state public utility statues contain provisions permitting commission authorizations to regulate "just and reasonable rates". See for example AL Code § 37-1-80 (2013) requiring that "the rates for the services rendered and required shall be reasonable and just to both the utility and the public. Every utility shall be entitled to such just and reasonable rates as will enable it at all times to fully perform its duties to the public, and will, under honest, efficient and economical management, earn a fair net return on the reasonable value of its property devoted to the public's service". S. 679 (1922) , reasoning that "Rates which ae not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used… are unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives the public utility company of its property, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment".
reasonable" rate should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for its continued operation
19
. Investors' confidence and capital attractiveness are particularly salient for utilities because utilities in financial distress are likely to be sponsored, subsidized or bailed-out by taxpayers due to their unique position as situational monopolies providing of essential services. 20 An operating failure of the public utility, whether due to illiquidity, insolvency, or simple shortage of power supply, is expected to induce a public crisis of confidence, as the social and economic infrastructure of our lives is a based on an implied assumption of continuous and uninterrupted electricity provision.
The statutory mandate to regulate public utility's ROEs to a just and reasonable level leaves rate regulators in somewhat of a methodological No Man's Land. State public utility commissions are generally free to establish ad-hoc their methodology in rate setting procedures. Perhaps due to its ease of use and comprehension by regulators not necessarily particularly vested in financial theories, the most popular method used to determine the ROE among state public utility commissions is what they refer to as the discounted cash-flow (DCF) approach, 21 which is a variant on the Gordon Dividend-Growth model and conceives of the price of a stock to be present discounted value of its future perpetual dividend stream. The FERC has officially adopted the DCF two-step methodology as its preferred method for ROE computation, based on the underlying premise that an investment is worth the present value of the infinite stream of dividends discounted at a market rate commensurate with the investment's risk
22
. Rearranged to solve for the required rate of return, the formula known as the constant growth DCF model can be expressed as follows: 20 (2008) . It bears noting that what the PUC utilities community refers to as a DCF approach is somewhat more specialized than what finance practitoners think of it as entailing. Because this paper is about utilities regulation, however, we adhere to that industry's nomenclature. 22 The FERC has adopted DCF as its main methodology for analyses of required rate of return in the 1970's. See, e.g., Minn. Power and Light Co., 3 FERC 61,045 at 61, 132-22 (1978) .
where D is the current dividend, 0 is the price of the common stock during the regulatory testing period, E(g) is the expected growth rate in dividends, and θ is an adjustment factor to account for the "lumpy" payment of dividends. 23 As many of the utility providers are public corporations, the price of their common stock and their dividend yield component are in the public domain
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. For the constant dividend growth rate, the FERC uses a two-step procedure, averaging short-term and long-term growth estimates. 25 The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES)'s five-year forecast for each company in the proxy group, is used to determine the expected growth for the short term
26
. The long-term growth rate-which is almost always lower-is based on forecasts of long-term growth of the economy as a whole, as reflected in GDP: public utilities are assumed to sustain long term growth consistent with the growth of the economy as a whole. 27 The practice endorsed by the FERC to compute the anticipated perpetuity growth rate is to accord the shortterm forecast receives a two-thirds weighting and the long-term forecast receives a one-third weighting.
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The two-step DCF methodology is purportedly used by the FERC to establish a zone of reasonablenesss for ROEs. Yet, an ROE may be both within the realm of reasonableness and be considered unjust and unreasonable: in other words, not all ROEs within the purported "zone" are 23 Under the FERC's approach, is pegged at 0.5, so that the dividend yield is multiplied by the expression (1+.5E(g)) to account for the fact that dividends are paid on a quarterly basis. Multiplying the dividend yield in this manner increases the dividend yield by one half of the anticipated growth rate and produces what the FERC refers to as the "adjusted dividend yield". See Massachusetts Attorney General et al. v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company et al., 147 FERC 61, 234 (2014) . 24 For the dividend yield component, the FERC uses a single, average dividend yield based on the indicated dividend and the average of the monthly high and low stock prices over a six-month period. See e.g., Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys., Opinion No. 510, 13 FERC 61, 129, at pp 232-234 (2011 CORPORATE FINANCE 215 (2017) , stating that "every finance dinosaur in the real world is using it".
is that returns and risk go together like a horse and carriage: CAPM provides a method for quantifying the stock's risk and its expected influence on the expected return for investors.
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According to the CAPM, the key to assessing the value of a security is to assess the response of the returns of this security to the returns on the market index. The beta coefficient, β, is defined as the sensitivity of the return of that security to the return of the "market" portfolio.
When valuing businesses, the Delaware courts strongly prefer the CAPM (or similar models) for determining risk-adjusted discount rates. However, once that rate is determined, something akin to the dividend-growth model is frequently applied to predict the company's "terminal" value as a stream of cash flows growing consistently in perpetuity. 
III. Data and Empirical Tests
This section draw on data from actual rate hearings in gas and electric utilities over a twelve-year period, evaluating the extent to which the rate setting process mimics a risk-adjusted return mandate. Our approach will be to treat the awarded return on equity from a rate hearing as a type of "asset price", exploring whether such returns in a manner similar to the returns on an equity investment yielding similar returns.
A. Data and Summary Statistics
We use as our primary data source the Public Utilities Fortnightly (PUF) ROE database, which we hand-collected from 2005 through 2016. The PUF data report on awarded ROEs in gas and utilities rate hearings, across all fifty US states, several Canadian provinces, and the District of Columbia. We augmented this data set by merging it with a variety of other data sources. First, we added data on several macroeconomic variables that would have been available to the PUC decision makers at the time of each rate hearing, including data on benchmark rates (such as US Treasuries) and widely-utilized forward-looking predictions on the market equity risk premium (taken from Duff & Phelps annual survey). We also collected Compustat and CRSP data for all publicly traded utilities in our sample (or, in many cases, on their publicly traded parents and holding companies), which included firm-specific information on assets, liabilities, accounting returns, and securities market pricing. To this, we added PUC-specific data from the Institute for Public Utilities at Michigan State University, tabulating the composition, elected/appointed nature and political party representation on state PUCs. Finally, for a later manipulation, we included data on a quasi-field experiment in which state PUC commissioners and staffs received immersion training in finance and valuation on temporally staggered basis.
We begin with summary statistics before proceeding to present results of a series of regression analyses. Consider first the Raw PUF data, which reports on awarded ROEs in announced regulatory hearings. The PUF data report on both gas and electric rate hearings, with a small number of combined gas and electric opinions. Table 1 compares the population of gas rate cases to electric cases. Overall, awarded electric ROEs are very slightly larger than those for gas, with a gap of around twenty basis points that tends to widen at the upper ranges of awarded ROEs (sixty basis points at the 95 th percentile). While still not statistically significant without controlling for other covariates, this gap will be born out with more comprehensive analysis below, and may reflect additional considerations that high-end electrical generation / transmission projects receive (e.g., solar arrays). Although will treat gas and electric rate cases in the same analysis below, we will typically control for the type of case.
[Insert Table 1 Here] by 2016. Interestingly, however, the overall reduction in awarded ROEs is not accompanied by lower variation in announced rates, which stays roughly consistent over the entire period.
Notwithstanding this aggregate variation over time, it is still clear from Figure 2a that the modal cluster of ROE awards at 10 percent remains persistent throughout the observational period.
Of course, raw awarded ROEs are not particularly well suited to compare to other financial asset prices, without controlling for capital returns. Table 2b If utilities stocks as a whole were becoming increasingly risky over the period studied, we would expect that utility would be climbing as well. But as can be seen from the figure, the utilities-index beta is generally falling over this period. Figure 2a tracks the abnormal returns of utilities over this period, which were very slightly (but not statistically significantly) higher than zero.
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b Here]
Finally, although not strictly an application of asset pricing, it is perhaps worth asking whether utilities' realized ROE after a rate hearing matches up well with the awarded ROE. This inquiry is in some ways circular, since the rate case is meant to lock in a subsequent ROE.
However, utilities may incur costs or investments in assets after the rate case that cause this mechanical identity to fail. Figure 4 provides a histogram of the extent to which awarded ROEs exceeded the mean realized ROE in the two years after the rate case. As can be seen from the figure, awarded ROEs appear to overshoot realized ROEs by between 1.5 and 1.75 percent-a figure that (while not statistically distinct from zero) raises some general questions about how well utilities rate setting operates.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
B. Identification Strategy
To test the conformity of rate decisions with the predictions of finance, we now proceed to consider the awarded ROE as if it were a return on a traded financial asset. If regulators are setting ROEs in a manner consistent with risk-adjusted returns, then ROEs should (in theory) behave in a manner that is well predicted by asset pricing theory. Our focus here is on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, for a variety of reasons. First, it is well known and accepted, among both finance practitioners and regulators, as a vehicle estimating returns. (The DCF approach, as noted above, has far less acceptance among finance professionals). Second, unlike other empirical asset pricing models (such as Fama-French), the CAPM's key input -the market equity risk premium (ERP) -has readily available forward looking predictions available for it. Such predictions, in fact, are a key input into valuation arguments that utilize the CAPM.
For each observed rate case with an ROE finding, we consider the following specification:
where � , − , � represents the awarded ROE spread over the risk free rate for utility i at time t, , is a series of controls (discussed below, and including potential experimental manipulations), and , is an error term. The term ̂, in (2) is the predicted spread of utility i's stock at time t, per the predictions of an underlying asset-pricing model. For the CAPM, this predicted spread is given by the well-known expression:
where , is the utility stock's risk relative to the market (its "beta"), , is the stock's abnormal deviation from the CAPM (or its "alpha"), and � , − , � is the expected market equity risk premium (ERM). Although the pure version of CAPM predicts that , = 0 for all securities, we allow for deviations based on empirical relationships observable at the time of the rate hearing.
Thus, if regulators are following the dictates of the CAPM, we would expect 0 = = 0, and 1 = 1. In all the regressions below, we utilize estimated utility-and time-specific values of , and , , using firm-level data if the utility is public and industry proxies otherwise. In the first set of regressions presented, we omit all non-CAPM controls; but later we include various controls that pertain to the commission hearing the rate hearing, including political party composition, size, and fraction elected versus appointed, as well as size and capital structure data on the utility. (This is the null hypothesis that we test-and reject-below.)
As noted above, the strong prediction of the CAPM is that the coefficient 1 should be 1 while 0 should be zero. We acknowledge, as others have noted, the CAPM may under-predict returns for smaller-capitalization firms, as well as firms that have extreme market-to-book ratios, inducing a non-zero estimate of , . However, we attempt to control for this by including estimates of , when available. In any event, our interest is only tangentially related to size premia, which would tend to bias our results in the opposite direction from what we see in the data.
Our analysis explores a variety of estimation approaches for (2). For publicly traded utilities, we utilized both raw estimated 60-month alphas and betas (as of the month of the rate order), as well as a blended "Ibbotson-adjusted" values of alpha and beta which is a weighted average of the raw beta and/or alpha (weight 2/3) with industry wide counterparts (weight 1/3).
(For non-traded utilities, the industry alpha and beta prevailing at the time of the PUC order are used.) For the ERP, we consider both the historical ERP measure and the (so-called) Supply-Side measure, both widely employed by financial professionals and provided by Duff and Phelps on an annual basis. 43 All of these measures would have been available to the PUC at the time of each rate order.
C. Results
Consider our first set of regressions pictured in Table 3 , which reports on a basic set of CAPM regressions (with standard errors clustered at the state level, as in all remaining regressions). Note from the Table that our key coefficient of interest, 1 , is not only nowhere near 1.0 (as predicted by the CAPM), but it is consistently negative in value. In all specifications, the estimate of 1 is statistically and economically distinct from its predicted value (of 1) at any conventional confidence level. In addition, the constant ( 0 ) in the regression appears to reflect an enormous abnormal return embedded in the awarded ROE, above and beyond abnormal deviations predicted through empirical alpha values. The inconsistency of awarded ROEs with CAPM, moreover, persists even in the presence of state and year fixed effects. We view this as strong evidence that whatever regulators are doing, they are not generally applying accepted asset pricing models to generate forward-looking estimates of equity cost of capital.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
If PUCs are not adhering, on average, to asset-price mimicking behavior, then what may be driving their decisions? Table 4 expands the analysis of Table 3 by adding a variety of firmlevel and / or PUC-level controls, as well as a control for electricity rate cases. (All regressions in the Table utilize Ibbotson-adjusted Beta estimates and Supply-Side ERPs).
[Insert Table 4 Here] Most of the firm-level attributes (log of assets, trailing ROE, and debt-equity ratio) appear to have little predictive power. While some of these factors are unsurprising, it is notable that leverage too appears not to have predictive value as to awarded ROEs, particularly in the light of the fact that realized ROEs tend to be persistently and positively related to leverage of all firms, including utilities as shown in Figure 5 below (generated from all public utilities represented in the PUF data). In the regulated setting, however, higher debt-equity ratios appear to have no systematic relationship to awarded ROEs. As discussed in the next section, the invariance of ROE to leverage may play an important role in providing incentives for utilities to avoid levering up strategically, in order to obtain an attractive ROE but also incur greater degrees of financial distress.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
Commission-level controls in Table 4 appear to provide some parts of the story behind regulatory rate setting. Note first that the number of commissioners on the PUC tends to predict a small reduction in "abnormal" awarded ROEs, possibly reflecting the possibility that larger commissions will are more likely to have either commissioners or staff with financial expertise.
In addition, the percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower awarded ROEs, with completely elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower returns on equity than completely appointed ones. This electoral effect may represent the cost that commissioners pay with rate payers by setting rates too high, and/or the greater impediments to regulatory capture by elected commissioners. Party-affiliated commissioners also appear to be associated with lower ROEs, though this effect does not appear to persist with the introduction of state and year fixed effects, which are likely to absorb party-associated effects for relative stable PUC political compositions (as many are).
Note once again, however, that just as in Table 3 , the inclusion of a variety of controls in Table 4 does not attenuate the strong inconsistencies of ROE announcements and the predictions of CAPM. As in Table 3 , awarded ROEs appear to move in the opposite direction as systematic risk, and awarded ROE spreads still have an unexplained component of around 7.5%.
D. Expertise and Training: A Quasi-Field Experiment
Although PUC commissioners and staff may be incentivized by a variety of factors other than asset-pricing concerns when setting rates, another factor deserving attention is whether the regulatory decision makers simply lack the expertise to evaluate finance-based arguments, thereby causing them to look to orthogonal factors. In other words, is the stark deviation from the predictions of CAPM illustrated above an artifact of some type of regulatory limitation on competence or receptivity to finance, or is it more reflective of inadequate training of regulators?
Our data allow us to test this question, using a fortuitous natural experiment. The Each May, the IRLE hosts a seminar geared towards educating state regulators about economic analysis of regulatory policy issues. Notably, the Institute distills the critical law and economics issues that arise in closely-regulated network industries and presents them in a coherent fashion. To present its curriculum, the IRLE draws on the expertise of leading academics, practitioners, and scholars. In short, the IRLE teaches regulators how to appreciate insights that emerge from important economic principles and concepts as well as how to apply them to regulatory situations in network industries.
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For the first four years of the workshop, finance was not included as part of the curriculum; but beginning in 2008, the IRLE began to devote an entire day (6 hours of lecture time) to finance, where regulators were exposed to some of the key components to discounted cash flow analysis and the CAPM, using examples from actual rate cases to motivate discussion.
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Although participants in the workshop were required to opt into attendance (and thus they self-selected), the mid-stream introduction of finance content helps to address some of the concerns that one might have with selection bias. In several baseline specifications, we compare treated commissions (i.e., those who attended) with untreated ones (those who never attended).
However, in other specifications we consider the effect of finance training solely within the population of commissions that opted the IRLE workshops (effectively constructing a "placebo" group consisting of those PUCs who opted into the workshop but did not receive finance training in the first four years). Table 5 summarizes the first year in which the commissions in our observation sample attended IRLE's program, as well as the first year the commission received "treatment" by finance training. (In some cases, the commission attended the program but did not receive finance treatment because their years of attendance pre-dated the provision of finance).
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Our identification strategy comes from the following specification:
This specification is identical to equation (2), except for the addition of (a) a diff-in-diff shift variable , that takes on the value of 1 if any member/staffer of PUC i has received finance training treatment on or before year t, and (b) a slope-shifting interaction term , •̂, , which allows for a training-induced change in the coefficient on the slope of the expected spread of the utility. The treatment effect from CAPM training would thus be reflected in coefficients 3 and 4 . Given the deviations from CAPM found in Tables 3 and 4 above, training would induce regulatory decisions more line with finance theory if 3 < 0 and/or 4 > 0. (Note in addition that the average combined CAPM coefficients for treated commissions would be a summed shift effect of ( 0 + 3 ) and a summed slope effect of ( 1 + 4 ).)
Tables 6 summarizes our results. 47 In the Table, the left panel considers all untreated PUCs, as a control, regardless of whether they opted to attend the IRLE program; the right panel retains only those PUCs that participated in the IRLE program (a universe that includes a "placebo" group never treated with finance training). As the Table 1 ). Second, finance training also alters the CAPM slope coefficient the predicted direction, albeit modestly. The point estimates of the slope parameter ( 4 ) is mildly positive, but not statistically significant; and the point estimate is high enough that, when combined with the baseline slope estimate, treated PUCs exhibit a very slight positive relationship between systematic risk and awarded ROE. The electoral responsiveness of commissions appears to persist in the presence of treatment, but the size effect disappears in the right panel of regressions, suggesting that PUCs seeking treatment (regardless of whether they received finance training) tended to alter their decision making less as a function of size than untreated commissions.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Two caveats deserve explicit attention before proceeding. First, we cannot rule out whether our findings as to the trainability of PUC regulators and staffs turned critically on the specific design of the treatment offered. The training program, part of a larger week-long immersion program in regulatory law and economics, was consistently staffed by substantially the same 47 As with the previous results, Table 6 clusters standard errors at the state level.
faculty over the observation period, proceeding in roughly consistent sequence. Although we observe program where finance training was not part of the curriculum (a convenient form of heterogeneity for selection-bias correction), our data therefore still do not permit us to distinguish about whether a peculiar aspect of this specifc program was particularly effective.
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Second, to the extent that training is effective, we want to be cautious about whether greater fidelity to asset pricing is itself conducive to overall welfare concerns. Indeed, to the extent that accurate risk-adjusted returns adjudication crowds out other laudable social policy goals, the trainability of regulators may ultimately be normatively undesirable, at least for certain plausible alternative objectives regulators may pursue (such as dynamic incentive provision). We note, however, that while training tends to dampen several other predictive factors in rate-setting, they remain in the picture, and thus it does not necessarily follow that better risk pricing necessarily crowds out other goals.
All told, we view these results as evidence that there exists some potential to train legal decision-makers to utilize the concepts of finance. We note that the effect is concentrated in the shift parameter, and that it is still a fraction of the size of the abnormal portion of the ROE spread.
Training evidently has mild effects on PUCs' responsiveness to prevailing systematic risk through the slope parameter. It may be possible that a multi-day or otherwise more immersive form of training would have even greater effects, but our data do not permit us to unpack this possibility.
IV. Conclusion
Under U.S. law, a public utility is entitled to earn a return on the value it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that made on investments in other businesses which are attended by corresponding risks. 49 We conducted an empirical analysis of rates awarded by PUCs in the U.S. and in Canada over a twelve year period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , in order to assess the relationship of awarded rates of return on equity to standard asset pricing models adjusting expected rates of return with anticipated risks. Our analysis demonstrates that rate setting practices adopted by PUCs diverge appreciably (even violently) from the predictions of financial economics across numerous dimensions.
Instead, our analysis suggests that current regulatory practice more plausibly reflects an amalgam of other desiderata that include political goals, incentive provision, insufficient financial expertise and regulatory capture. We identify some factors may be at play, including the possibility that regulators' behavior reflects objectives that are either orthogonal or opposed to precise risk-return calibration, such as serving political constituencies, providing dynamic incentives, and possibly even regulatory capture. We find evidence that the structural composition of the commission is correlated with the awarded rates: The percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower awarded ROEs, with completely elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower returns on equity than completely appointed ones. We additionally conjecture that the divergence of observed regulatory behavior from asset-pricing fundamentals may be due (in part) to a lack of financial valuation expertise among regulators. To test this conjecture, we study a unique field experiment that exposed commissioners and their staffs to immersion training in finance. We find evidence that treated PUCs began to issue ROE rulings that were (moderately) more aligned with standard asset pricing theory than those of untreated placebo groups. -0.0400 -0.0200 0.0000 0.0200 0.0400 0.0600 CAPM Alpha (by Utility) 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 5 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 6 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 7 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 8 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 9 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 0 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 1 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 2 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 3 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 4 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 5 Date (Monthly) -1 0 1 2 3 CAPM Equity Beta (by Utility) 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 5 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 6 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 7 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 8 0 1 j a n 2 0 0 9 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 0 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 1 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 2 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 3 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 4 0 1 j a n 2 0 1 5 Date (monthly) 
